lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanlu; mohammad ali hojati
Abstract
First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, ...
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First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, nemed to broad logical necessity, is a kind of logical necessity. By this definition of metaphysical necessity, the relation between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is partial-general-and-specific. Third, on the one hand we’ll critique the modal generalism in which our intuitive perception of modality will be refuted and on the other hand, some accounts of modal particularism like Possibilism and Haecceitism are confronted with some kind of Ungroundedness. Next, we’ll present a new account of modal particularism. In this new account, the concept of “being a possible world”, as a modal concept, is counted as Primitive concept. With the help of this new account and the concept Conceiving, we’ll present a new definition of Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility. At last, we shall show that in this new definition, the relation between epistemic and metaphysical possibility is absolute-general-and-specific.
mohammad zare' pour; mohammad ali hojati
Abstract
Some philosophers apply Gödel incompleteness theorems to show that modeling the mind by means of a machine is not possible. Arguments based on these theorems are called Gödelian arguments in philosophy of mind. In this article, we want to criticize three Gödelian arguments. These arguments ...
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Some philosophers apply Gödel incompleteness theorems to show that modeling the mind by means of a machine is not possible. Arguments based on these theorems are called Gödelian arguments in philosophy of mind. In this article, we want to criticize three Gödelian arguments. These arguments have been presented, respectively, by Rudy Rucker, John Randolph Lucas and Roger Penrose. We try to show that: (a) some parts of Rucker’s argument are and some other parts of it are not sound; (b) Lucas' argument is absolutely failed; and (c) some parts of Penrose’s argument are sound and some other parts of it are doubtful.
mohammad ali hijjati; morteza mozgi nejhad
Abstract
Intelligent systems are designed on the model of the operation of mind; but they come across, at least, the following problems: (a) Can IS solve every problem? (b) Is there any correspondence between the above problem and the undecidability of the first order predicate logic? Before finding proper answers, ...
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Intelligent systems are designed on the model of the operation of mind; but they come across, at least, the following problems: (a) Can IS solve every problem? (b) Is there any correspondence between the above problem and the undecidability of the first order predicate logic? Before finding proper answers, we should know the characteristics of an intelligent system and how it solves a problem and what do we mean by its decidability. In this article we have dealt with the above issues and will show that an intelligent system is a kind of algorithmic system and since we can find a problem (halting problem) which is unalgorithmic, that system cannot solve it; this means that an intelligent system cannot solve all the problems and hence is undecidable. This undecidability, in turn, shows that the logic (i.e. first order predicate logic) which governs the system is also undecidable.
